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ABSTRACT: The pervasiveness of the digital ecosystem reconfigures the organization of work. The new in-
dustrial revolution is increasingly based on the platform as a new productive paradigm. Platforms are more 
than a technical device and they produce huge effects in the labour market: lowering access credentials 
and empowering casualization of work, dis/re-intermediation labour demand and supply, affecting motiva-
tions and rewarding systems, reconfiguring process of control and risks transfer, renewing regulative 
standards, or re-organize representativeness and welfare protection. Fragmentation, precariousness, flex-
ibility and instability become permanent traits of the workforce fostering the emergence of the cybertari-
at. Moreover, connectivity, evaluation and surveillance determine new working conditions tested on 
workers outside any bargaining process or institutional work arrangement. Platform workers (both high 
skilled and low skilled) are still largely unorganized and isolated. Similarly to other non-standard workers, 
they are exposed to the risk of exploitation and free work in a fast evolving economy based on reputation. 
Despite platform workers are highly differentiated and heterogeneous and difficult to organize collective-
ly,  forms of collective action are emerging at local and cross-national level. 
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1. Introduction: “Everywhere there can be a platform, there will be a plat-
form” 
 
With this sentence reported in the title, the 2018 MIT Platform Strategy Summit cel-
ebrates the era of a new dominant paradigm (MIT 2018, 2) that is redefining the organ-
isational and business strategies at global level. The pervasiveness of the platform 
model is spreading rapidly in post-industrial societies (Degryse 2016). A previous report 
from MIT (2017) states that 88% of the most profitable businesses surveyed by Fortune 
almost ten years ago have disappeared, in favour of the new platform companies, 
mostly concentrated in the USA (75%, and only 3% are European). Also in the Forbes 
Ranking on the World's Most Valuable Brands in 2018, the top five positions are held 
by the Big Fives of the platform economy's (the so called GAFAM system- Alphabet-
Google, Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft), which replaced in less than ten years 
companies like Coca Cola, Toyota and General Electric. 
But what is a platform? 
The concept has existed for at least five hundred years and with a plurality of mean-
ings: firstly, to define a physical structure for carrying out an activity or an operation 
(for example in a port), or, in a more abstract sense, to define a model or a pattern of 
ideas (for example a political-programmatic platform). Lastly, the concept in its current 
meaning refers more to the world of ICT as a set of software or hardware develop-
ment, often used to build on systems and services for different application domains1.  
Therefore, the platform is considered a basic system for creating poly-functional and 
adaptive solutions. From this idea of platform would derive also the idea of  platform-
isation as a modular technological architecture (Baldin and Woodard, 2009),  a set of 
components with “low variety" (19) to which to graft "a set of peripheral components 
with high variety" (ibidem).This type concept has long been at the basis of the new 
product development. Therefore, a platform is intended as "the collection of assets 
that are shared by a set of products" (Robertson and Ulrich 1998, 20). This product de-
sign concept was established with the affirmation of the modular factory to guarantee 
market competitiveness, limiting the costs of customization and reducing the time-to-
market (Arcidiacono, 2013). However, the platform thinking (Sawhney, 1998) was not 
only a mantra of product planning between the 80s and 90s, but a regime of power 
and the result of a real battle for hegemony based on the definition of a dominant 
 
1 https://www.techopedia.com/definition/3411/platform 
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standard in to which to link infinite possibilities of product and service development 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). 
Recently, the idea of platform is related more to the concept of  multisided markets 
(Boudreau and Hagiu 2009; Rochet and Tirole 2006; Evans 2003). This idea is much 
more oriented and focused on efficiency and competitiveness of the business model, 
than related to product design. As argued by Simon (2011), platforms are “valuable and 
powerful ecosystem that quickly and easily scales, morphs, and incorporates new fea-
tures, users, customers, vendors, and partners” (33). In this sense, the platform aggre-
gates services and re-intermediate or disintermediate the relationship between supply 
and demand. Therefore, the platform “uses technology to connect people, organiza-
tions and resources in an interactive ecosystem where incredible amounts of value can 
be created and exchanged”. (Chouldry et al., 2016, 4).  This business  co-developed 
within the so-called lean start up model  coherently with the californian ideology of the 
90s (Barbrook and Cameron, 1996; Luise, 2019), that hybridizes participatory ideals, 
cyber-enthusiasm and economic liberalism. In the last thirty years, the Silicon Valley 
has shaped the discourse and imaginary on innovation by institutionalizing it around 
three fundamental actors (start-ups, venture capitals and incubators), around which 
platform as described mainly as a successful model related also to other mythologies, 
like the "garage entrepreneurs" or symbolic figure like Steve Jobs, Mark Zuckerberg 
and Elon Musk. 
However, platform models can also be varied. Srnicek (2017) identifies five types: 
advertising platforms (Google, Facebook) that extract information about users, analyze 
them and then use the product of this process to sell advertising space; cloud platforms 
(AWS, Salesforce), that have the hardware and software for the functioning of digital 
companies available on request; industrial platforms (GE's Predix, Siemens Mind-
Sphere) that build the hardware and software necessary to transform traditional manu-
facturing companies into digital processes based on the Internet of things; product 
platforms (Spotify, Zipcar) that use other platforms to transform goods into services 
(good-as-a service model); lean platforms (Uber, Airbnb, BlaBlaCar) that minimize the 
direct ownership of assets, starting from the workforce, generating new models of ser-
vice intermediation. 
Gawer (2014), trying to combine managerial perspective and product design per-
spective, talks about platforms as “evolving organizations or meta-organizations” 
(1240) that federate and coordinate constitutive agents, create value by generating 
economies of scope entailing them within a  modular technological architecture com-
posed of a core and a periphery. Gawer's proposal highlights the need to look at the 
platform also as a new productive paradigm (Arcidiacono 2019, -see table 1). In the 
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Taylorist-Fordist production model the company was vertically integrated into a pyra-
mid structure characterized by the "internalization" of all the intermediate processes 
that led to the construction of the final product. In the flexible model the ability to re-
spond to markets was privileged, increasing job qualification and process specialization 
which actually encourages the outsourcing of some production phases to a network of 
suppliers and sub-suppliers. This last model does not operate in a mass market but in a 
mass of markets, based on the primacy of knowledge/information for the definition of 
adaptive/responsive strategies to market fluctuations. Marketing passes from mass 
marketing to relational marketing. The consumer becomes a customer and begins to 
play an increasingly active role in the production process. In the era of platforms, the 
mass of markets has been further fragmented and pulverized into a fluid heterogeneity 
of niches and tribes of interconnected consumers. The market is conditioned by the in-
creasingly consistent importance of information and relational flows, more than of 
goods (in this sense we could talk about conversational markets). In the platform mod-
el, the strategic value passes to consumers, who become the co-authors or prosumers 
and the capacity of innovate for the company, and also its efficiency, are measured 
precisely with the possibility of creating a greater expressive and creative possibility for 
users within the platform that could be transformed into value.  Platform companies 
openly reject the role of producers as well as that of intermediaries, preferring the 
term of enablers. This distinction allow them to argue against regulation, even if they 
actually produce, distribute and intermediate work, goods and services. They act as 
heterarchies or möbius organisation (Stark and Watkins 2018), based on the co-
optation (sometimes even aggressive) of assets and resources trying to avoid any per-
manent alliance or fully formalised constraints. If the dominant production paradigms 
in the previous industrial revolutions were mainly borrowed by manufacturing (and in 
particular by the automotive one), in the post-industrial era the outsourcing processes 
and the growth of relevance of the ICT sector push for a new model extremely lean, re-
ticular and diffusive production, coherent with the idea of the “platform”. Platforms 
act as boundaryless organizations based on a product-as- a-service logic. They are 
based on a core central system (not exclusively digital) that engages and coordinates 
diversified production systems and networks of human and non-human co-operators 
and complementors, professional or amateurial.  For this reason, Haydn Shaughnessy 
(2015) affirms that these plat-firms are coordinators of interactions that therefore re-
quire new forms of work, engagement, leadership and integration that cannot be bor-
rowed from previous models. This model transcends the digital economy environment 
innervating the “old” offline economy, which looks at this as a new benchmark: the au-
tomotive sector in this sense is the perfect example, to the point that they do not want 
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to present themselves anymore as simply product producers but as a hub for mobility 
services2. At the same time platforms “as organizations, they can also take on a power-
ful institutional role, solidifying economies and cultures in their image over time” (Brat-
ton 2015, 41). 
Moreover, according to Van Dijck and colleagues (2018) , platforms cannot be stud-
ied in isolation, apart from social and political structures, because they are all (in-
ter)dependent and  they draws their strength from the hegemonic role of the Big Fives, 
that define a social, and not only technological, infrastructure crucial for any socio-
economic activity and social interaction. Platforms represent the most recent example 
of the neo-liberist governamentality in Foucaultianan terms, because it acts as a socio-
technical construction that aims to realize a reasonable approximation to "perfect mar-
ket", functioning with relatively homogeneous commodities, low barriers to entry, and 
the “apparently” open competitive encounter of the buyers and sellers, empowering at 
the same time knowledge availability (for example, through the algorithmic coding of 
trust or feedback between transactors) and personalization of price making process 
(i.e. through dynamic pricing mechanisms). This  plural and complex ecosystem is often 
not easy to assess in terms of implications and impacts, or at least within a single re-
search design project. In this sense, the present issue takes the challenge of this com-
plexity  through ten articles focused on how platform model impact on organization, 
work and labour rights. 
 
 
2. Disrupting labour? 
 
The platform companies are concretized in such a plurality of practices and organiza-
tional sub-designs that can configure differentiated sets of opportunities and risks for 
 
2 The choice of Volvo to not exhibit any cars on its stands during the 2018 International Motor Show in Los 
Angeles is emblematic of this strategical shift. As a Volvo manager, Michele Crisci, commented “We want 
the public to look at us not as simple vendors of cars but as a partner offering mobility services". Similarly, 
after buying scooter sharing company Spin for $40 million, Ford declared that it would aim to diversify its 
holdings in transportation and mobility businesses not related directly to car sales business. Daimler and 
BMW group announced in April 2018 that they had formed a joint mobility company that combines their 
Car2Go and DriveNow car sharing services. The two brands will collaborate in different business areas re-
lated to the innovation of mobility services. They intend to focus on multimodal and on-demand mobility 
apps like Moovel and ReachNow, combine the services of Mytaxi, Chauffeur Prive, Clever Taxi and Beat, 
and combine the parking services Park Now and Parkmobile Group / Parkmobile with ChargeNow and Digi-
tal Charging Solutions. 
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workers: degree of autonomy, risks of marginalization and precarisation, career paths 
and types of reward. 
 
Table  1 –Comparing platform as a productive paradigm 
  Fordism Toyotism Platformism 
Theoretical framework Taylor’s Scientific Labor 
Organization 
Sabel & Priore Flexible 
Specialization 
Vargo e Lasch’s Service 
Dominant Logic 
Reference Market Mass Market Mass of Markets Conversational 
 Markets 
Technology Specialized Polivalent Accessible 
Structure Piramidal Networked Eterarchical 
Production Standardized Differentiated Customized 
Phase of Production Integrated  Limited outsourcing Wide outsourcing 
(crowdsourcing) 
Labour Formal and low quali-
fied 
Formal e  
high specialized 
Formal and informal 
with different degree of 
specialization and profes-
sionalization 
Information Scarce and Fragmented Shared and reserved to 
people involved in produc-
tion 
Share and redundant, 
inside/outside 
Marketing Mass Marketing Relational Marketing Societing 
Type of consumer Buyer Client Prosumer 
Consumer  
involvment in 
production 
None At the beginning (mar-
ket analysis) and at the end 
(post-selling services) 
In whole the phases of 
production 
Source: new elaboration based on Arcidiacono (2019).  
 
Being an intrinsically hybrid model, with infinite combinations of different character-
istics and solutions, represents the main difficulty in assessing the social and work im-
pact of platforms. This would firstly determine a problem of estimation of how many 
platform workers are. As Pais (2019) explains, the various attempts of estimation put in 
place still represent a methodological challenge for various reasons: many platform 
workers do not always perceive themselves as such, and in any case often the work of 
platform is not the only work done, and it has no continuity (not by chance we talk 
about workers on tap, slash-workers or patch-workers or gig workers). It is therefore an 
invisible, fragmented, domesticated, and casualised work. In some cases, Pais contin-
ues, the workers confuse the work on the platform with the work sought online, be-
cause the two activities are not mutually exclusive and are continuously complemen-
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tary. Even an estimate through institutional data is not possible, due to the poor social 
security and fiscal traceability of the platforms activities. Consequently, the only ones 
who have such data are the platforms themselves, which however consider these as 
confidential information and they are not always willing to share them for statistical 
purposes. It follows that the statistics available on the platform work are not sufficient-
ly reliable and show often inconsistent results: some statistics elaborated through sur-
veys in the USA (Current Population Survey Staff 2018; Katz and Krueger 2016; Farrell 
and Greig 2016) estimate that platform workers share is between 0,5 and 1%; a Euro-
pean research (Huws et al. 2017) that compares the incidence of platform workers in 7 
countries, including Italy, highlights that 22% of the Italians interviewed say they have 
done at least some form of platform work among those envisaged by the survey, 
against 12% of the Germans or 9% of the Dutch. 
Some scholars have ventured also into the enterprise of classifying the plurality of 
platform work, but even this seems to have turned out to be anything but a simple op-
eration. Codagnone et al. (2016), for example, propose to distinguish between cogni-
tive, electronically transmissible work (eg: E-Lence), and tasks that require manual 
work or physical interaction (eg: Foodora), while Eurofound (2018) enlist even 27 pos-
sible criteria that could diversify the contents of work within a platform. 
Given the difficulty of estimating the overall impact of the platform work, many 
scholars concentrated on case studies focused on single platform, especially in food de-
livery and in ride-sharing) (Tassinari e Maccarrone 2019; Rosenblat et al., 2016), even if 
there are not lacking of contributions in the field of freelance professionals (Gandini et 
al. 2016). 
The available research shows ambivalent results of the platformisation of work: on 
the one hand, it increases the empowerment of the subjects, lowering the barriers to 
market entry, allowing the emergence of "hidden" forms of exchange and labour prac-
tices, increasing opportunities for visibility. This is particularly evident in the work of 
Armano, Briziarelli and Risi on the young free-lancers designers who work through 
crowdsourcing platforms. In this case, the platform work becomes an opportunity for 
visibility and development of a personal branding strategy, in a professional market al-
ready heavily segmented between insiders and outsiders; the young designers use the 
platform to "crowd out" the most experienced professionals on the market; on the 
other hand, they have to invest more and more in "free work" in the hope that this 
capital of visibility could be economically convertible both inside and outside the plat-
form. According to Risi, Briziarelli and Armano, the power of many platforms lies in the 
fusion of life and work sphere, with a growing interdependence between paid and un-
paid work. In their article the authors identified this intrinsic feature as the most seduc-
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tive and ambivalent aspects of crowdsourcing platforms: with their capability to pro-
mote opaque free work and, at the same time, offering opportunities for expression, 
identity building and cultivation of social and professional relations. 
This implication is also related to another important effect of the platformisation of 
work:  platforms acts as a working extending technology redefining the boundaries be-
tween private /public space, or between  work/family place, which had been a salient 
transformation of the industrial era. The two contributions on Airbnb, written by Bruni 
and Esposito, and by Saturnino and Sousa, explore this issue. These articles confirm 
how platforms are not merely intermediaries constituting a “set of relations that con-
stantly needs to be performed” (Van Dijck 2013, 26). Through notifications and indica-
tions to the hosts, the platform regulates and organizes their work in an almost rigid 
manner, turning them into micro-entrepreneurs of their everyday life. As Marx already 
argued, technology affects the relationship between capital and work redefining even 
the boundaries between productive and socially reproductive work. However, technol-
ogy acts more as a tool for dispossession rather than a tool of alienation: first of all, 
dispossessing worker identity in itself trying to eliminate the word “work” or “worker” 
in the platform vocabulary, using instead terms like riding, hosting, sharing, , etc.; sec-
ondly, dispossessing the “sacredness” of our private space because in the platform 
economy our home, our cars or bikes, even our thoughts and feelings are “on sale”; 
thirdly, according to Morozov (2011), dispossessing our data, that are transformed into 
tradable assets or as a tool of mass surveillance. It is the “Onlife” paradigm (Floridi, 
2014), as an hyperconnected and fluid reality without any distinction between online 
and offline, that exposes our everyday experience and even our personal asset to fi-
nancialization or value exctractive strategies.  
In the scenario, a fundamental role is played by the algorithm. It establishes hidden 
metrics for performance but also atomizes work pushing competitiveness among indi-
viduals. As Polkowska observes on her article in this issue about Uber drivers in Poland, 
the algorithmic logic is somehow internalized to the point that the condition of hyper-
exploitation and precariousness is legitimized or even justified by the workers. This last 
trait is clear evidence of what Arvidsson (2019) recently called the transition from in-
dustrial capitalism to industrious capitalism: technology becomes a tool for an econo-
my  "more labour intensive but capital poor" (ibid., 10). Despite the rhetoric that em-
phasizes the disruptiveness of technological change, the new scenarios indicated by 
Arvidsson seem more like a regressive society oriented towards a sort of "re-
feudalization" where, as Casilli (2019) also observes, the future of work increasingly 
takes on the features of pre-industrial work. 
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3. Disrupting welfare? 
 
Some authors interpreted these changes as a means to boost efficiency, productivity 
and improve cooperation among geographically dispersed workers (Brabham, 2013; 
Hienerth et al., 2014). However, it also contributes to reducing the labour costs, with-
out any significant obligation regarding labour regulation, income welfare rights and 
intellectual property (Chandler and Kapelner, 2013; Djelassi and Decoopman, 2013; 
Hirth et al. 2013; Satzger et al. 2013; Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft, 2014; Irani 2015; 
De Stefano, 2015). At the same time, crowdsourcing enables companies to maintain a 
high control over the nature and contents of the work and to rate performances and 
payments without any human contact (Sachs, 2015; Irani 2015). This raises further 
concerns about the nature of some types of crowd work, seen also as a new form of 
technological Taylorism (Kittur et al. 2013) which, however, escapes the rules and 
guarantees of subordinate work. In other words, if on the one hand this type of work is 
mainly carried out as an independent activity, on the other hand it appears as an anon-
ymous and repetitive but highly regulated and controlled work. Gray and Suri (2019) 
analysed the deep dismantling of employment relations because of the spread of plat-
forms. They call ghost works those invisible and low-paid human activities that powers 
digital platforms. According to Heiland the picture is more complex. Crowdwork brings 
new challenges in terms of coordination and control of work. However, while simple 
crowd work shows high degrees of technological control, as the level of qualification 
rises, the amount of technological control decreases. Whether it is high or weak labour 
control, such a kind of employment relations are expected to have significant impact 
not on only on the labour market but also on business strategies.  
Digital Platforms are redefining working processes, working spaces and working 
times (Kaine and Josserand 2019) playing a relevant role in exacerbating trends toward 
the projectification of work (Murdock 2003), exploitation (Armano, Murgia, Teli 2017), 
hyper control of workers (Schörpf et al., 2017).  Busacca outlines how the concept of 
community is inappropriate to describe platforms, which on the contrary appears 
mainly as coalitions or networks which employ Hybrid workers.  
As stated by Pulignano, traditional companies paying the minimum wage and 
providing social security benefits cannot compete with companies that source a grow-
ing part of their services from independent contractors. Against this background, also 
the traditional organizational model of industrial relations appears to be doomed to 
disappear. The same is for the working conditions and social protection as they evolved 
in the last decades. Gaps in social protection coverage for crowd workers risk to further 
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exacerbate inequalities and jeopardizes the labour market, especially where these 
workers are classified as self‐employed and independent contractors.  
Universal tax financed welfare schemes can provide basic safety net for these work-
ers, as they are not directly linked to employment status, particularly for those workers 
excluded from social insurances schemes. Minimum wage and minimum income, as a 
dedicated welfare safety net, can contribute to counterbalance inequalities and low 
wages. But the state can also act to clarify the employment rights of these hybrid 
workers, often categorized as self-employed, but at the same time subjected to control 
and hetero-direction by platforms (see always Pulignano on this point). Hybrid workers 
who remain trapped in this grey zone need to be better identified and targeted, not 
only by new social protection tolls but also local and community based initiatives 
aimed at providing dedicated welfare new service, training and opportunities for local 
development. In her conclusions Pulignano highlights the importance of this strategy, 
resorting to local platforms and a stable consultation among local stakeholders, includ-
ing local governments and trade unions.  
 
 
4. Platform workers’ representation: an open issue 
 
Digital labour platforms (DLPs) are the most recent challenge for the organisations 
representing workers because they exacerbate long term-trends of non-standard work 
diffusion (Brewster et al., 1997; Schmid, 2011; Eurofound, 2017; Vermeylen et al., 
2017; Garben, 2019) and labour market insecurity (Hyman & Gumbrell-McCormick, 
2017). DLPs have been created long after the end of the so-called Fordist class com-
promise when corporate ownership and production strategies were mainly national 
(Hyman 2015). As the mature product of the globalisation, DLPs have been conceived 
to operate in several countries with the same digital infrastructure and their profitabil-
ity relies on cross-national scale economies. Territories and markets are the targets of 
aggressive strategies and they can be abandoned just as quickly. This raises the ques-
tion of what kind of representation is possible when the workforce becomes a mere on 
demand commodity in fast-moving markets. Several scholars underline that DLPs oper-
ate in a grey area that overcome both the traditional concept of employment and self-
employment (De Stefano, 2015; Prassl & Risak, 2015); other scholars theorise that they 
are configuring a new economic relationship termed ‘platform labour’ (Wood & Leh-
donvirta, 2019). DLPs started to operate in several European countries before a proper 
regulative framework was defined; they tend to be free riders strongly reluctant to 
open a dialogue with trade unions and new representative organisations (Kilhoffer et 
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al., 2017). At present, there are only a few examples where the DLPs have opened a di-
alogue with trade unions or have signed agreements. One of them is represented by 
the German Company Delivery Hero, recently converted into a “European Company” 
(Societas Europaea SE). The shift has implied some positive constraints on employees’ 
participation at board level. The agreement signed with the European Federation of 
Trade Unions in the Food, Agriculture and Tourism - EFFAT foresees at least one em-
ployee representative within the SE-Works Council (SE-WC) and the participation of 
employees in the Supervisory Board of the group, in the same number and with the 
same voting rights of shareholders. Another exception is represented by the Danish 
cleaning services platform Hilfr that signed a one-year trial agreement (in 2018) with 
the trade union 3F, according to which its workers have right to pension, holiday pay, 
collective-agreement wages. In a general context where platform workers are isolated 
and commodified (Wood, A. J. et al., 2019) signs of resistance and collective action are 
rising. Vandaele (2018) underlines that a variety of actors such as grass-roots unions, 
traditional unions and union-affiliated guilds along with worker-led platform coopera-
tives are developing multiple initiatives to support platform workers following in some 
cases a ‘logic of membership’ in other cases a ‘logic of influence’ (Offe and Wiesenthal 
1980). The former ideal type implies that the organisation is mainly focused members’ 
immediate needs and interests; the latter instead implies a prevalent focus on lobby-
ing.  
Within this special issue, through a focus on creative work in The Netherland and It-
aly, Bellini and Lucciarini explore how new collective actors such as mutual-aid coop-
eratives and professional associations are building new collective narratives and forms 
of collective organisation. Evoking a comparison with 19th century social and working 
context, the authors underline how the mutual-aid cooperatives are reacting to a lack 
of social protection and the professional associations are engaged in regulating specific 
professions according with the occurring changes. In doing so also the role of old actors 
such as trade unions is considered, showing an emergent paradox: they are well struc-
tured and they have relevant resources but they are still struggling to overcome struc-
tural and cultural constraints that limit their capacity to represent creative workers. 
New actors instead, are more effective in interpreting the contemporary working scene 
but their action is limited by a lack of resources and a weak organisational structures.  
The collective dimension is scrutinised also by Chesta, Zamponi and Caciagli who 
analyse why and how, despite the increasing precarisation and atomisation fostered by 
the platform economy, workers of food delivery are engaged in relevant collective ac-
tions, fuelling public debate and triggering institutional reactions. Focusing on collec-
tive actions in four Italian cities, the authors claim that the combination of three key 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 12(3) 2019: 611-628, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v12i3p611 
  
622 
 
factors (visibility, the mix of old and new repertoires of action and mutualistic practic-
es) foster riders’ mobilisation. 
 Marrone and Finotto instead, analyse the specific case of Rider Union Bologna as a 
relevant example of informal unionism among riders.  The authors’ analysis sheds lights 
on how power asymmetries, which define the relations between riders and platforms, 
could be passed by a strategy that combine the involvement both of public opinion and 
the public institutions. Also in this case, the rise of new collective actors (Hyman and 
Gumbrell-McCormick, 2017) appears as a relevant topic in the contemporary working 
scene dominated by the capitalistic model of platform economy. Platform workers’ 
representation proves to be a testing ground for different actors; local initiatives are 
planned taking into account also transnational solidarity networks. Moreover experi-
mental projects such as Tukopticon (Irani and Silberman 2013, Silberman 2015) and 
Fair Crowd Work3, are trying to implement a transparent system where DLPs and cli-
ents are reviewed and evaluated by platform workers. The battleground of platform 
workers’ representation is therefore both on-line and off-line, both at local and trans-
national level and it involves new and old actors. The initiatives emerged in recent 
years testify the vitality and the growing interest on platform workers; despite this, a 
full and satisfactory offer of representation remains an open issue. 
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